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Abstract
We examine the development of UK outlets of a major fast food chain, from inauguration in
1974 until 1990, after which industry structure changed somewhat.  The chain effectively
introduced the counter-service burger concept.  Locational spread across local authority
district markets is explained by the characteristics of the areas where the outlets are sited.  Of
special interest is the effect of scale economies, measured by outlet numbers in neighboring
districts.  Both first and second entry are examined.  We find that the hazard of first entry is
positively influenced by market size and population density and negatively by distance from
company headquarters.
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21.  Introduction
One of the pervasive phenomena of the twentieth century is the spread of chain stores.  In the
latter part of the century, a prominent element of this has been the spread of chain fast food
outlets.  These have enjoyed remarkable success in expansion, so that fast food chains now
constitute a significant industry. Our purpose in this paper is to examine determinants of the
spread of a paradigmatic case.  In doing so, we argue, we are casting light upon the
phenomenon of the growth and development of chain stores generally.
No authoritative data exist for the size of the fast food sector in the UK, but they do
for restaurants as a whole.  A comparison1 with farming is instructive in showing that
restaurants are a very significant industry.  There are over 21/2 times as many people
employed in restaurants, as there are in agriculture, even including the large number of
seasonal and casual workers in the farming industry.  The total earnings of those employed in
restaurants are roughly 80% above the earnings of people employed in agriculture.  Gross
turnover (output) in agriculture is roughly equivalent to turnover in restaurants.  Thus, taken
as a whole, restaurants are arguably at least as important an industry to the UK economy as is
farming. Moreover, whereas farming is an industry in decline, both the restaurant sector and,
most probably, the fast food element of it, are growing quite rapidly (with turnover in
restaurants up approximately 32% over four years2).  Consumption of most basic foodstuffs
(meat, dairy products, potatoes, flour, bread etc.) in the home has been declining in terms of
grams per person for many years, whilst eating out has increased rapidly as a proportion of
consumer expenditure.  Thus to study the growth of the fast food sector is to examine an
industry of considerable and growing significance to the UK.
In this paper, we examine the growth of a particular fast food company, McDonalds
(McD) in the counter service burger market.  Our investigation, for reasons we explain in
                                                
1 The data quoted below relate to the year 2000 or 1999 and all come from the UK Annual Abstract of Statistics,
2002.
2 The manner in which these data have been collected has changed slightly over the period.
3more detail later, centers on the growth from its inception in the UK until a period 17 years
later when it first faced significant competition.  A shorter subsequent phase, during which we
examine a duopoly, is the subject of an earlier paper (Toivanen and Waterson, 2001).  The
company in question may justifiably lay claim to having innovated a method of food
production in the UK (and elsewhere) and has demonstrated a long period of successful
organic growth. However, our focus is on the more specific issue of uncovering the variables
that explain the duration of time before which an outlet opens in a particular market location. 3
Our study is the first, to our knowledge, to examine timing of entry into regional markets.4
Other features of interest in our paper include the investigation of second entry, the manner in
which geographical characteristics of the market feature in the explanation of duration, and its
focus on a service activity.
There are essentially two empirical literatures bearing upon the issue we examine.
One relates to diffusion of innovations.  The other concerns fertility.  Modeling the duration
of time before a client adopts an innovation is quite a popular activity in studies analyzing
process innovation. Examples of such studies include Hannan and McDowell (1984), Rose
and Joskow (1990) and Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) (recent surveys are Geroski (2000)
and Stoneman (2001)).  Hannan and McDowell (1984) use a duration model to investigate the
decision by banks to adopt automatic teller machines (ATMs).  They assume that a firm is
more likely to adopt an ATM, the greater the profit differential between adopting and not
adopting.  In turn, they identify a number of firm and market characteristics that will help
determine profitability; these include the wage rate in the market, market growth, and firm
size.  Rose and Joskow (1990) use data on coal-fired steam-electric generating technology to
investigate the effect of firm size and ownership on technology diffusion. Karshenas and
                                                
3 A legitimate question arises as to whether it would be more straightforward to ask the company themselves
what factors influenced opening policy.  We are not adopting this direct approach because we feel it is unlikely
the company will have a corporate memory extending back almost 30 years, because they may not wish to
articulate their policy to outsiders and, most importantly, because the tools used in the years we study may well
have been implicit rather than explicit- certainly their approach towards opening outlets became more
sophisticated only in the mid 1990s.
4 There are certainly other studies that examine the distribution of firms across regional markets (following from
4Stoneman (1993) construct a general duration model of technology diffusion that combines
the main elements present in the competing theories of process-technology diffusion and
apply them to data on the diffusion of computer numerically controlled machine tools (CNC)
in the UK engineering industry.  A hazard-rate approach is undertaken, with the conditional
probability that a firm adopts a new technology in a given time being dependent upon
variables from the rank, stock, order and epidemic effects models (although only the first and
last of these prove significant).  In more recent work, Battisti and Stoneman (2002) employ
the same dataset in examining intra-firm diffusion.  Overall, the key element these studies
identify as being important for adoption time is the size of the purchaser market.
However, another aspect of the literature that provides a strong influence on our
econometric work relates not to diffusion, but rather fertility.  Heckman and Walker (1990)
concern themselves with fertility dynamics.  They estimate a reduced-form neo-classical
model that brings together various factors, such as childlessness and inter-birth intervals, that
relate to life-cycle fertility.  They attempt to discover whether these factors are sensitive to
male income and female wages.  Previous studies indicate a negative relationship between a
woman’s education and the number of children she has (completed fertility), with a woman’s
education here being used as a proxy for her wage.  The interesting aspect of this study is that
it examines duration before first and second child.  In a similar way we examine duration
before first and before second entry into a market, something that has not been done
previously.
In order to investigate duration models of diffusion adequately, Karshenas and
Stoneman (1993, p.513) state that the project dataset employed should satisfy a particular set
of criteria: “[T]he ideal would be a dataset with complete life histories of the population of
potential adopters, as well as the characteristics of a well-defined new technology over a
sufficiently long period beginning with the appearance of the technology in the market.”
Essentially, this is what we have.  In the current study, the potential adopters of the new
                                                                                                                                                        
Bresnahan and Reiss, 1989), but these commonly take a snapshot or compare two periods of time.
5technology, that is a McDonalds outlet, are the Local Authority Districts within the UK.  Data
relating to McDonalds is available for the full 1974-1990 period, commencing with outlet data
for the first McDonalds which opened in Greenwich in October 1974.  Local Authority data is
also available for the period of study, and therefore their proposed requirements are fully met
in our data set.
Our plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows.  We first discuss the
characteristics of the market we study in section 2, then develop our economic model of entry
in section 3, explain our econometric method in section 4 and discuss our results in section 5.
We conclude with some implications of our findings.
2. Characteristics of the Market and the Data
We argue that the fast food counter-service burger market is a well-defined (and dominant)
segment of the general fast food market. Counter service is significantly different from table
service, because of the very different amounts of time involved in supplying food.  Over the
period in question (from 1974 to 1990), counter service burger sales grew significantly in the
UK at the expense of earlier fast food activities, primarily fish and chips.  However, the nature
of the outlets is very different. Fish and chip sales were (and are) concentrated very much at
particular established times of day, early lunchtime and evening, often very late evening, and
do not normally operate outside those times.  Nor, for historical reasons, did they operate on
Sundays.  By contrast, burger outlets commonly open from around 9am, seven days a week
and supply continually until mid or late evening.  Fish and chip outlets seldom incorporate
seating.  They employ batch rather than continuous production methods.
Geographically, we define the local market to be equivalent to the local authority
district.  People in the UK do not travel far to satisfy their fast food needs, in part because
much of the custom arrives on foot. The local authority district is a convenient level at which
to perform the analysis, since comparable data on key variables are available for long periods,
6something required for this analysis.5  It is also the administratively relevant level of activity,
since it is local authority districts that are charged with implementing planning guidance, and
in order to open a fast food outlet, that outlet/ location must have been designated as “A3”
usage.6 Moreover, it is of significance that local authority districts differ considerably in their
core characteristics such as size.
TABLE 1 HERE
Table 1 shows some key features of the markets, illustrating this diversity in terms of
factors such as population and wages, and the differences in the samples of the markets for
first and second entry.  Note, for example, that the maximum (male) wage is larger in the
sample for second entry. This is due to two facts: first, there is general wage inflation as
second entry observations by definition are later in calendar time than first entry observations
from the same market. Second, there is a selection effect. If McDonalds systematically enters
markets with above average wages earlier, the average (and maximum) wages in the sample
for second entry will be higher than those in the sample for first entry. Further, note that
average geographical size of markets at risk of second entry is considerably smaller than that
of market at risk of first entry. The average population of second entry markets is larger by
some 40%.  Clearly, they are much more densely populated.
Because of the large variation in characteristics, we may expect that some markets are
considerably more attractive prospects to enter than others and hence will be entered sooner.
Our estimation strategy relies on the position that the characteristics of the innovator remain
essentially constant, whilst the characteristics of the units of observation vary considerably, so
that we may hope to identify precisely the key elements of districts that influence the decision
process in determining duration before entry.
TABLE 2 HERE
                                                
5 By lucky chance, the last major re-organization of the structure of districts was completed in 1974, since which
all changes have been minor.  Basic demographic data is available since 1974.  To these we add data on distance
of the district from McDonalds Head Office, in miles by road- see later.
6 Prevailing planning guidance states that sufficient supply from existing outlets is not a criterion for refusing an
A3 listing to a proposed new outlet.  However, the number of A3 outlets in total within an area may be
7The market as defined above is very amenable to study of innovative entry.  Table 2
illustrates some key chronological features of the market as a whole.  McDonalds introduced
the counter service concept in 1974 and the established market player Wimpy eventually
perceived it as a threat (Pollard, 1985). However, because it was dominated by existing
franchised table-service outlets, Wimpy never strongly embraced the counter service concept,
and indeed in a major industry reorganization in 1990, abandoned counter service altogether
for many years.  It is also not a chain that has experienced strong growth at any time since
McDonalds’ entry into the market.  By contrast, the growth of counter service burger outlets
in the hands of McDonalds has been remarkable in extent, so that we have plenty of activity to
observe, and remarkable also in that virtually no closures have taken place- we are observing
entry without exit.  Thus, we are observing a successful innovation, embraced wholeheartedly
by the company.  McDonalds went from 0 to 381 outlets in 17 years, with but a single
confirmed exit.  We finish our main exploration of the data in 1990, since in 1991 Burger
King becomes a credible second force in the industry for the first time.  Prior to this,
McDonalds had no powerful competitors.  However, we plan to re-examine this later period
using the same maintained assumption to check the nature of the impact upon the McDonalds
expansion process.  One other feature worthy of note is that in the UK, McDonalds largely
developed as a management-operated company, not through franchise operation. Franchising
did not start until 12 years had elapsed since the first entry and even by 1995, only 20% of
outlets were franchise operations. Moreover, it is a highly centralized company, whose
franchisees do not make independent decisions about location of outlets.  Therefore, we
consider the location decision to be a prerogative of central management and aggregate
franchised and managed outlets together.
FIGURE 1 HERE
Figure 1 shows that, viewed as an innovation, McDonalds’ spread across local
authority districts does indeed take on the characteristic “S”-shaped diffusion pattern observed
                                                                                                                                                        
constrained.
8in so many previous studies.  Similar figures drawn for second and for third entry into a
district do not exhibit a slackening of growth in the later periods, indicating a less mature
degree of fill-in, as might be expected.  However, our purpose is not to demonstrate that an S-
shape exists, but rather to examine the much more sophisticated issue of explaining duration
before entry into particular districts. In this context, the firm McDonalds represents the supply
side in this study, and it is assumed to be the decision-making unit, choosing where to supply
each subsequent McDonalds outlet.
McDonalds outlet data was obtained direct from the Company’s UK head office.  It
embodies information on store location, including the postcode and telephone number, store
type (owned or franchised, drive through or not), exact opening date and store number7.
There are 381 outlets included in the main estimation dataset and each is matched to a Local
Authority District using either a Midas “Postzon” package based on UK postcodes, the
Bartholomew Postcode Atlas of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (a Royal Mail
publication), or the website www.upmystreet.com.
The Local Authority Districts are physical places and they represent the demand side
in this study.  This is the smallest consistent unit of local government in the UK, and generally
consists of a city, or a town with some hinterland, or a largely rural area.  The estimation
dataset relates to 455 districts, since districts in Northern Ireland and most island-based
districts (the Scilly Isles, Orkney, Shetland and the Western Isles) are not included in this
study.  There are 17 consistent annual observations for each of the 455 districts within the
estimation sample, namely; geographical area, population, the distance from the district to the
McDonalds headquarters, the number of McDonalds outlets in neighboring districts and full-
time male wages.  The geographical area and population data mainly come from Regional
Trends (formerly Regional Statistics).8 In certain cases, the definition of the districts has
                                                
7 The store number provides a very useful cross-check on opening data and enables us to verify exit.
8 A full list of district-level data is not available for all years, and therefore various Regional Trends sources
(Office of Population Censuses and Surveys and Annual Report — Registrar General Scotland) are used in
addition.  The wage data are at sub-regional level.
9changed in minor ways during the 1974-1990 period.9  Population and area data for the
districts in question is transformed to be consistent with the 1990 definition of the districts10.
The distance from each district to the McDonalds headquarters in Finchley is calculated by
assuming that the location of the district is at the named place in the case of a district based on
a particular name e.g. Coventry in the case of Coventry district.  In some cases, the district’s
name does not correspond to a name on a map, and in this case, the location of the main
council offices is taken to be the place.  Distance is then calculated using the Automobile
Association product ‘A to B’; a commercial software product designed to help people plan
their journeys.
For each year of study in each district, the number of pre-existing McDonalds’ in
neighboring local authority districts is calculated. Neighboring districts are identified by using
maps from the Office for National Statistics.  A neighboring district is defined as any district
connected continuously by more than a single point to the district in question.
Using the panel of market-level data described above, the hazard of McDonalds
opening an outlet in market j in year t is investigated.  We view the prime question as being
whether or not an outlet is opened, rather than the size of the outlet opened, which is a second-
order decision. Also, the time to first and to second entry within a district is analyzed,
allowing differences between first and second entries to emerge. Time starts running from
January 1974 where the first entries are concerned, whereas time for the second entries starts
running from the opening of the first outlet.  Hence, second and higher outlets have different
calendar times.
FIGURE 2 HERE
In Figure 2 we depict the empirical hazard rate of first entry. As can be seen, it rises
relatively quickly to 7-8%, and shows signs of decline towards the end of the sample period.
                                                
9 We use geographical area data to check consistency in local authority definition over time, with any
discrepancy >1% investigated.
10 In order to construct the revised population data, the percentage of an area that is to be added to another is
multiplied by the former area’s population figure to give the amount by which the latter’s population has to
increase.  Consequently, the former area’s population is reduced by the same amount.
10
This reflects most likely two facts: first, the best markets by then already have a first outlet,
and second, the remaining markets without outlets are less attractive than is second (or higher)
entry into those markets where the first outlet is already in place. Figures 3 and 4 respectively
show how the sample for second entry evolves, and the empirical hazard rate for second entry.
Note that the hazard is not calculated in calendar time, but in years from first entry. Figure 3
shows that more markets are “at risk” of having a second entry, the later the time in the
sample we consider. Figure 4 shows the empirical hazard. It exhibits a relatively steady
increase over time, the exception being year 14, in which no entries occurred.
FIGURES 3 AND 4 HERE
3. Modeling Entry
Let us first consider the hazard of McDonalds opening a first outlet in market j in year t.  Our
approach is very reduced form and assumes the company selects new locations on the basis of
expected profitability, choosing to locate in a subset of districts in any one year.11  We assume
that all districts are potentially “at risk” each year12 and assume that in principle the firm
opens everywhere where it is profitable to do so at that time.  However, we know that
exploring and investing in new sites is a time-consuming activity and development of the
chain takes many years.  There are several possible explanations for this pattern.  Either there
may be a limit on how many outlets can be accurately assessed per year, for institutional
reasons (so that for example a multi-stage decision is taken, with some opportunities
examined in more detail than others), or development costs may fall over time as a result of
innovations and economies in the process,13 or demand may rise over time as consumers
become more used to buying the product, so rendering increasing numbers of sites viable.
Whichever of these is the case, it will become profitable in surveying potential locations over
                                                                                                                                                        
11 Presumably, in principle decisions regarding exit are also taken, but we ignore these on de minimis grounds.
12 There is strong evidence in the data for an annual planning round.
13 As an example, there is some indirect evidence on this coming from a presentation by McDonalds executives
to a conference at CIFE, Stanford in 1997.  The emphasis in this presentation was on a new approach to
developing outlets that reduced the time and money spent on developing outlets through linking the work of
architects, contractors, etc much more closely through use of common technology platforms.  This approach was
11
time to open outlets in previously sub-marginal areas.  Thus at any given point in time,
whichever of these processes is in operation, choices are made about the next sites to open.
The likely main influences on the process can be discerned from the literature reviewed
earlier.
The most important factor potentially involved in explaining duration before entry (or
the hazard of entry, which is what we actually examine) is market size, of which the
proximate determinant is population- the greater is population of potential consumers, the
greater the hazard of entry.  Given market size, we may argue, the more densely populated is
the market the greater the hazard, so that the larger the geographic area covered by the local
authority, ceteris paribus, the lower the hazard. But in both cases these are likely to be non-
linear relationships- e.g. doubling market size is unlikely to halve the time before an outlet
opens in that district. Given population, demographics may also have an influence.
Distance from Head Office of McDonalds is also likely to have an influence, either in
terms of demand or, perhaps more plausibly, in terms of costs. The further away is the district
from head office, the greater the costs of surveying potential sites and arranging construction,
the more likely are tastes to be unknown or undeveloped and the more costly to monitor and
to service the outlet with inputs.  Again these factors are likely to have a non-linear impact on
the hazard and we take this into account in our empirical formulation by using each variable
and its square as explanatory variables.
Wage levels are also likely to have an impact, coming either from the demand or the
cost side.  In terms of demand, higher wage levels in an area increase demand, other things
equal.  In terms of costs, higher wage levels mean greater costs of operating an outlet.  Hence
the overall impact is unclear. Again, there is no reason to expect the effect to be linear.  We
include only the squared (male) wage rate into the estimation equation. The reason is that
having both the linear and squared term created problems in the second entry estimations, and
to retain the comparability of first and second entry results, we dropped the linear term from
                                                                                                                                                        
being introduced as a concept in the US starting in 1993.
12
the first entry estimation as well.14
Outlets in neighboring districts present a more difficult problem.  In developing an
area, if there are already outlets in neighboring areas, we conjecture it makes it more likely
that an outlet will open ceteris paribus - there are economies of density in examining
locations and in servicing sites.15  In line with Toivanen and Waterson (2001), it is also
possible that McDonalds learns about “true” market size through outlets in neighboring
districts. This happens if regional tastes (initially unobserved by McDonalds) are correlated
across districts. If indeed these factors are important, then “geography matters”- the
development of the chain will be conditioned by the fact of where it started.  We measure
neighbors by dividing the number of outlets in neighboring districts (at the beginning of the
period) with the geographical area of the district itself. The idea is that the larger the
geographical district, the smaller are the potential economies of scale, and the learning effects
from outlets in neighboring districts. We treat this variable as exogenous for two reasons.
First, since it is measured at the end of the previous period, it is by design independent of the
contemporaneous error term. 16  To explain the second, consider market i. We allow that entry
decisions into i are affected by the (area-weighted) number of neighboring outlets, and that
entry decisions into i’s neighboring markets are affected by the number of outlets in i. For the
neighbor-variable to be endogenous, entry decisions into neighboring markets would have to
be affected by the unobservable of market i over and above the effects of existing outlets in
market i. We consider this very unlikely.17
We consider second entry to be subject to the same basic determining factors as is first
entry18, although we have very much less in terms of previous work to guide us in this area,
since it has barely been considered within the diffusion literature.  Thus, for example, the
                                                
14 The linear wage always obtained an insignificant coefficient.
15 On the other hand, it is possible that neighboring area outlets will “spoil” a market if they are too close.
16 Notice that our model does not involve forward- looking behaviour on McDonalds’ part.
17 Blundell and Powell (2001) propose a method  (control function estimation) that would allow us to treat
neighboring outlets as an endogenous variable.
18 This is in line with Battisti and Stoneman (2002) who use inter-firm diffusion approaches in their investigation
of intra- firm diffusion.
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larger the population, the earlier a second outlet will be opened in a district, ceteris paribus.
Hence, our basic estimating equation in both cases is along the following lines:
Hazard = f(pop, area, dist, wage,  neighbor)               (1)
4. Econometric Method
Our objective is to model the conditional probability that a McDonalds outlet will enter a
particular district, conditional upon one not having entered up to that point in time.  We
estimate the time duration (hazard) to first entry using a non-parametric baseline hazard
estimation procedure, on top of which we place a parametric explanatory element using the
variables listed in (1) above.
Although the underlying process can be thought of as occurring in continuous time,
the data are not observed in that form.  The survival times have been grouped into discrete
intervals of time (years) so that observed spell lengths are summarized using positive integers.
For the purpose of this study, the observations on the transition process are therefore assumed
to occur in discrete time.  The discrete-time hazard can be thought of as a conditional
probability rather than a rate and is therefore bounded between zero and unity.  We use the
Prentice-Gloeckler (1978) model incorporating a gamma mixture distribution to summarize
unobserved heterogeneity, as proposed by Meyer (1990).  This is a proportional-hazards
model, also known as a log-relative hazards model, that implies that absolute differences in
explanatory variables lead to proportionate differences in the hazard rate at each point in time.
Explanatory variables included in the model are either fixed over time (area and distance) or
are time-varying (population and neighbors).  The time-varying covariates are assumed to
vary between time intervals but to be constant within each of them.
The discrete-time model we consider can be obtained by grouping time in the
continuous-time proportional-hazards model.  Each district i = 1,…n, faces the possibility that
a McDonalds outlet will open within its border at time t = 0.  The continuous-time hazard
function for district i at time t > 0 takes on the proportional hazards form
14
where l0(t) is the baseline hazard at time t, u is a gamma distributed random variable, exp(.) is
the exponential function, x i(t) is a vector of covariates summarizing observed differences
between individuals at t and b is a vector of parameters to be estimated.  The baseline hazard
is assumed to take on a non-parametric form that allows differential effects between years.
This strategy focuses on estimation of the regression coefficients b leaving the underlying
baseline hazard describing the data completely unspecified.
Failure to control for any unobserved or omitted district-specific effects that may
affect the hazard function will lead to inconsistent parameter estimators (Lancaster, 1990).
Unobserved or omitted heterogeneity between districts is addressed in the above model by
including a gamma distributed random variable u, with unit mean and constant variance s2.  A
maintained assumption is that u is distributed independently of x and t.
The associated continuous-time survivor function is
The underlying continuous durations are, as mentioned above, only observed in disjoint time
intervals [0=a0, a1), [a1, a2), [a2, a3),…,[ak-1, ak=¥).  Given that a proportional-hazards model
is assumed, the discrete-time survivor function for the jth interval has the same form as (3),
and the discrete-time hazard in the jth interval is
All intervals are assumed to be of unit length, and the recorded duration for each
district i corresponds to the interval [ti-1, t i).  Those districts having a McDonalds entry during
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the interval are identified using the censoring indicator ci = 1, and those that remain in the
state are identified using ci = 0.  The latter have no entry during the interval and are right-
censored.  Given these assumptions, the log-likelihood function for the sample of N districts is
where q(j) is a function describing duration dependence in the hazard rate.
5. Estimation Results
Column 1 in Table 3 shows the results of the estimation of the first entry hazard.  All models
control for unobserved (Gamma distributed) heterogeneity. Tests showed that models with
such controls are preferred to models without. Results with parametric baseline hazards and
without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity were very similar and are therefore not
shown. We see that almost all explanatory variables have a significant impact on the hazard of
first entry; in each case the effect is non-linear. Population has an increasing impact on the
hazard, tailing off as population increases, but still comfortably positive at the mean.
Distance, in an opposite manner, has an initial negative influence on hazard, but the influence
tails off as distance increases.  At the mean, it is still negative.  Area of the district has an
essentially similar impact to distance, with the implication being that with population held
constant, as population density increases, the hazard increases, but at a decreasing rate.  The
number of outlets in neighboring districts has a positive impact on hazard of entry, indicating
economies of scale and/or learning effects of there being nearby outlets.  All these variables
have a statistically very significant impact upon the hazard.
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TABLE 3 HERE
FIGURE 5 HERE
Figure 5 shows the basic pattern of the underlying estimated baseline hazard: The hazard
increases strongly in the later years, although the estimates of the values for the later year
dummies are admittedly somewhat imprecise.  Comparisons with the raw entry rate depicted
in Figure 2, are interesting.  As can be seen in Figure 2, the hazard increases rapidly after
about the first seven years of presence, then shows signs of tailing off towards the end of the
period of observation,19 in a way broadly consistent with the estimated values.  Figure 5 also
demonstrates the effects of geography by displaying the difference in the estimated hazard at
sample mean of distance from the estimated hazard at the sample minimum (6.1 miles) of
distance- as can be seen the impact is very significant.
Turning then to the second entry results in column (2) and comparing them with
column (1), we see that the pattern of signs is reversed for population, while results for area
are close to each other.  What is slightly puzzling is that the population effect is negative at
the mean of (2nd entry sample) population. Distance results are close, although now the linear
distance term obtains an insignificant coefficient. Wages have the opposite (positive) effect on
second entry. Interestingly, the number of outlets in neighboring districts (divided by own
geographical area) now carries a large negative coefficient.  A plausible story for this is that
(on average) the neighboring outlets have a negative effect on sales of the 2nd outlet due to
partial spoiling of the market.
6. Conclusions
Our results show that the basic structure of explanatory variables we have developed is
capable of capturing very nicely the underlying elements of the hazard of entry of a
McDonalds fast food outlet into a district of the UK.  One implication worthy of note is the
extent to which “geography matters” to the result- it matters not just what the characteristics
                                                
19 There is thus no strong evidence that the introduction of franchising led to an increase in the hazard of first
entry.
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of the district are, but also how far it is from head office, and whether the firm has a presence
nearby or not.  In this respect, we may conjecture that if McDonalds had started in Glasgow,
or Birmingham or Manchester say, rather than Greenwich in London, the overall pattern of
development would have been very different.  It would be interesting indeed if it transpires
that this result is true more generally, something we intend to examine in later papers.
Furthermore, the findings regarding neighboring outlets, whilst obviously subject to
caveats, are also intriguing, because they reinforce the influence of distance on the outcome.
They also imply that chance regarding the location of early outlets (for a given distance from
head office, and given population etc.) can have an influence on the spread of a chain.  For
example, it would seem that if a chain develops first in a westerly direction, then this westerly
bias is likely to continue.  This is a fascinating possibility, which obviously requires further
investigation.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics on Local Authority Districts
First Entry Sample Mean Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Area (1000 square km) 0.557  0.765 0.003   6.497
Population (Hundred thousands) 0.108 0.090 0.005   1.087
Wage (£1000) 0.134 0.064 0.040  0.345
Distance (miles) 182.139 133.9086 6.1 674.4
Second Entry Sample Mean Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Area (1000 square km) 0.116 0.061 0.003 5.236
Population (Hundred thousands) 0.153 0.087 0.004 1.022
Wage (£1000) 0.211 0.056 0.043 0.535
Distance (miles) 110.2019 88.75329 6.1 565.3
NOTE: Number of observations in the first entry sample 6342, in the second entry sample
1276.
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Table 2
Key Dates in the UK History of Burger Retailing
Date Event
1955 Wimpy brand established as offshoot of J Lyons
1974 McDonalds opens first store
1977 Wimpy chain bought by United Biscuits
1978 Wimpy establishes first counter-service outlet
1982 Wimpy has 35 counter service outlets
1983 McDonalds exceeds 100 outlets
1986 Wendy's leaves the UK, selling last 16 restaurants
McDonalds exceeds 200 outlets
McDonalds starts to franchise outlets
1988 Burger King brand (at this time small) bought by Grand Met
1989 Grand Met buys Wimpy from United Biscuits
1990 Burger King has 60 outlets
Grand Met’s burger operations separated into table and counter service
Counter Service operations mostly rebadged as Burger King
Wimpy International formed with 220 table-service outlets by
management buy-out from Grand Met. Grand Met insists on 3 year
agreement preventing Wimpy opening counter service or drive in
outlets
1993 June: Grand Met/ Wimpy agreement expires
Wendy's plans return
McDonalds has around 500 outlets
1994 Wimpy has 240 outlets, all eat-in
end 1995 Burger King has approx. 300 outlets McDonalds has over 600 outlets
May 1996 Wimpy has 272 outlets
McDonalds and Burger King each opening around 70 restaurants per
year
1998 Wendy’s has around 10 outlets
2001 Wimpy still has less than 300 outlets, McDonalds over 1000 outlets
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Table 3
Estimation Results
Variable First Entry Second Entry
Population 20.352***
(2.960)
-58.282***
(8.019)
Population squared -20.600***
(4.230)
69.100***
(12.100)
Area  -2.824***
(0.466)
-2.465**
(1.243)
Area squared 0.456***
  (0.084)
0.059
(0.053)
Distance from HQ -16.695***
(3.190)
-15.653
(10.292)
Distance squared 22.700***
(6.27)
50.100*
(27.600)
Wage (male) squared -0.047***
(0.016)
0.104***
(0.021)
Neighbors per unit area 0.5745**
(0.2620)
-3.4162***
(0.7310)
Nobs. 6342 1276
LogL. -763.0101 -339.5886
LR 490.4942***
(24)
295.8743***
(20)
Unobs. Het. 0.000 0.000
Notes: Numbers reported are coefficient and standard error. All estimations incorporate
a non-parametric baseline hazard and Gamma distributed unobserved heterogeneity.
Separate period dummies for all those periods where entry occurs.
LR = LR-test of the joint significance of the model (d.f.). Differences in degrees of
freedom is due to different grouping of period indicators in the baseline hazard.
Unobs. Het. = p-value for the Gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity.
*, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1% level.
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Figure 1: McDonalds First-Outlet Diffusion
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Figure 2
1st Entry Empirical Hazard Rate
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Figure 3
Distribution of Time at Risk for 2nd Entry
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Figure 4
2nd Entry Empirical Hazard Rate
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Figure 5
Estimated Hazard of 1st Entry
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